We assess the procyclical effects of bank capital regulation in the context of a dynamic equilibrium model of relationship lending in which banks are unable to access the equity markets every period. Importantly, banks anticipate that shocks to their earnings as well as the cyclical position of the economy can impair their capacity to lend in the future and, as a precaution, hold capital buffers. We find that these buffers are countercyclical under risk-insensitive capital requirements (e.g. Basel I) and procyclical under risk-sensitive capital requirements (e.g. Basel II). Yet, under risk-sensitive capital requirements, the higher buffers maintained in expansions are insufficient to prevent a significant contraction in the supply of credit at the arrival of a recession. We show that, in the context of Basel II, making the underlying confidence levels slightly countercyclical would strongly reduce the procyclical effects on the supply of credit without compromising banks' long-run solvency targets.
Introduction
The financial crisis that started in the summer of 2007 has generalized the concern about the procyclicality embedded in the financial system and, more specifically, in institutional and regulatory aspects such as accounting rules, trading and risk-management rules, and bank capital requirements. All recent reviews of the challenges for the immediate reform of financial regulation (e.g. Brunnermeier et al. (2009 ), FSF (2009 ) stress the need to make the financial system less procyclical. This paper focuses on providing a framework for the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the procyclical effects of bank capital requirements.
We use the model to compare the cyclical behavior of the supply of credit under riskinsensitive (Basel I) and risk-sensitive (Basel II) capital requirements, and to assess potential countercyclical corrections of the latter.
Even when capital requirements are essentially flat, like in Basel I, bank capital regulation has the potential to be procyclical because bank profits tend to turn negative during recessions, impairing banks' lending capacity. The problem is potentially much more important when capital requirements are risk-sensitive, like in the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach of Basel II, since in this case, even if a bank's total capital were not directly impaired, the rise in risk associated with the arrival of a recession might lead to a severe contraction in the supply of credit. 1 Two key conditions are necessary for these contractionary effects to occur. First, some banks must find it difficult to respond to the higher capital requirements by issuing new equity. Second, some of their borrowers must be unable to switch to other sources of finance. However, these conditions are not sufficient for the existence of significant procyclical effects, since banks anticipate that shocks to their earnings as well as the cyclical position of the 1 In the IRB approach capital requirements are an increasing function of banks' estimates of the probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD) of each loan, and these inputs are likely to rise in downturns. In theory banks must feed the capital requirement formulas with "through-the-cycle" estimates of the relevant PDs and LGDs, but a variety of reasons (short data samples, ratings migrations over the cycle, etc.) make the actual estimates very likely to vary over the cycle. The extreme case in which this happens is when "point-in-time" estimates of PDs and LGDs are utilized. 2 These conditions have been noted by Blum and Hellwig (1995) and parallel the conditions in Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) for the existence of a bank lending channel in the transmission of monetary policy. economy can impair their capacity to lend in the future and, as a precaution, may hold capital in excess of the regulatory requirements. The critical question is whether capital buffers (that will endogenously respond to regulatory changes) will be sufficient to neutralize the procyclicality added by the new requirements.
To address this issue we develop a tractable dynamic equilibrium model of relationship banking in which the business cycle is modeled as a two-state Markov switching process that affects business failures and, thus, loan default probabilities. At every date a continuum of entrepreneurs enters the market. They demand funds for two consecutive periods, giving rise to an overlapping generations structure. Consistent with the view that relationship banking makes banks privately informed about their borrowers, we assume that (i) borrowers become dependent on the banks with which they first start a lending relationship, and (ii) banks with ongoing relationships have no access to the equity market. The first assumption captures the lock-in effects caused by switching costs and the potential lemons problem faced by banks when a borrower is switching from another bank. 3 The second assumption captures the implications of these informational asymmetries for the market for seasoned equity offerings, which can create prohibitive transaction and dilution costs for urgent recapitalizations. It is consistent with the experience seen during the current crisis and with a view already expressed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004, paragraph 757) when approving Basel II: "It may be costly for banks to raise additional capital, especially if this needs to be done quickly or at a time when market conditions are unfavorable." It can also be seen as a convenient reduced-form for the observed delays in banks' recapitalizations. 4 The combination of relationship lending and the inability of banks with ongoing relationships to access the equity market establishes a natural connection between the capital shortages of some banks at a given date and the credit rationing of some borrowers at that
date. Yet, each cohort of new borrowers is assumed to be funded by banks that renew their 3 See Boot (2000) for a survey of the relationship banking literature. Several papers explicitly analyze the costs of switching lenders under asymmetric information (e.g., Sharpe, 1990) as well as the trade-offs behind the possible use of multiple lenders as a remedy to the resulting lock-in effects (e.g., Detragiache et al., 2000) . We are implicitly assuming that these alternative arrangements are prohibitively costly. 4 Barakova and Carey (2001) study the time to recovery of US banks that became undercapitalized in the 1984-1999 period, showing that they needed an average of 1.6 years to restore their capital positions. lending relationships, have access to the equity market, and hence face no binding limits to their lending capacity.
In order to isolate the potential cyclicality coming from the supply side of the loan market, we abstract from demand-side cyclicality and aggregate feedback effects that might mitigate and exacerbate, respectively, the aggregate implications of the cyclicality in banks' lending capacity. The model, however, could serve as a building block of a more comprehensive dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which, say, part of the production comes from entrepreneurial firms that require relationship bank finance.
We define equilibrium under the assumption of free entry into the banking sector, which implies that the banks' net present value at the dates in which they can issue equity must be zero. We characterize the equilibrium loan rates and banks' capital decisions in each state of the economy, and derive a number of comparative statics results. Assuming that equity financing is more costly than deposit financing, we show that capital requirements increase equilibrium loan rates, but have an ambiguous effect on capital holdings. On the one hand, the higher prospects of ending up with insufficient capital call for the holding of larger buffers; on the other hand, higher capital requirements reduce the profitability of future lending, and thus the bank's interest in preserving its future lending capacity. Our analytical expressions suggest that the shape of the distributions of loan losses in different states of the economy matter for determining which effect dominates. Since the impact of capital requirements on the supply of second period loans is, therefore, analytically ambiguous, we assess it numerically.
For the numerical analysis, we describe the distributions of loan losses according to the single risk factor model of Vasicek (2002) , which provides the foundation for the IRB capital requirements of Basel II. Under this model, capital requirements have an exact value-atrisk interpretation: required capital is such that it can absorb the potential losses of a loan portfolio over a one-year horizon with a probability (or confidence level) of 99.9%.
5 Our analysis focuses on the comparison between the risk-insensitive regime of Basel I and the risk-sensitive regime of Basel II, as well as on the proposal and assessment of a specific cyclical correction of Basel II.
We find that when the value of the ongoing lending relationships is large enough and the cost of equity capital is not very large, banks optimally choose to keep capital buffers. Under realistic parameterizations, Basel II leads banks to hold buffers that range from about 2% of assets in recessions to about 5% in expansions. The procyclicality of these buffers reflects that banks are concerned about the upsurge in capital requirements that takes place when the economy goes into a recession. We find, however, that these equilibrium buffers are insufficient to neutralize the effects of the arrival of a recession, which may cause a very significant reduction in the supply of credit. 6 Under the flat capital requirements of Basel I, the same economies would exhibit slightly countercyclical buffers and essentially no credit crunch effects. 7 For the purposes of comparison, we also compute the equilibrium in a laissez-faire environment without capital regulation, finding that banks' capital buffers (in this world, pure "economic capital") would be of around 5% and not very cyclical, and credit rationing would be more cyclical (and on average higher) than under Basel I, but less cyclical (and on average lower) than under Basel II.
Our results also show that the probabilities of bank failure under the Basel II regime are substantially lower than under the Basel I regime and, as one would expect, much lower (about 100 folds!) than in the laissez-faire benchmark. This suggests that the business cycle side-effects of Basel II may have a payoff in terms of the long-term solvency of the banking system. It also suggests the possibility of ameliorating the procyclical impact of Basel II by introducing some small adjustments in the IRB capital requirements. In this dimension, we consider the possibility of modifying the cyclical profile of confidence levels in a way that 6 Supervisors seem aware of this possibility. For instance, Greenspan (2002) claims that "The supervisory leg of Basel II is being structured to supplement market pressures in urging banks to build capital considerably over minimum levels in expansions as a buffer that can be drawn down in adversity and still maintain adequate capital."
7 Some papers, starting with Bernanke and Lown (1991) , point out that the introduction of Basel I caused a credit crunch in the US during the months preceding the cyclical peak of 1990. But no credit crunch episode has been detected after banks adjusted their capital holdings to the higher requirements.
keeps their long-term average at 99.9%, but lessens the target in those situations in which credit rationing turns out to be the highest under the Basel II regime. We find that these adjustments may achieve significant reductions in procyclicality without major costs in terms of banks' long-term solvency.
The papers closest to ours are Estrella (2004) , Peura and Keppo (2006), and Zhu (2008) . Estrella (2004) considers the dynamic optimization problem of a bank when its dividend policy and equity raising processes are subject to quadratic adjustment costs, loan losses follow a second-order autoregressive process, and bank failure is costly. The paper focuses on the comparison between the optimal capital decisions of the bank in the absence of regulation and under a value-at-risk rule, concluding that they are very different. Peura and Keppo (2006) consider a bank with an asset portfolio of exogenous size in the context of a continuous-time model where raising equity takes time. A supervisor checks at random intervals of time whether the bank complies with a minimum capital requirement. The paper finds that the bank may hold capital buffers in order to reduce the risk of being closed for holding insufficient capital when audited. Finally, Zhu (2008) adapts the model of Cooley and Quadrini (2001) to the analysis of banks with decreasing returns to scale, minimum capital requirements, and linear equity-issuance costs. Assuming ex-ante heterogeneity in banks' capital positions, the paper finds that for poorly-capitalized banks, risk-sensitive capital requirements increase safety without causing a major increase in procyclicality, whereas for well-capitalized banks, the converse is true. Relative to these three papers, we simplify the details of the banks' dynamic optimization problem and embed such problem in the context of an equilibrium model of relationship banking with endogenous loan rates. Additionally, we adopt the realistic loan default model of the IRB approach of Basel II and focus on the implications for the dynamics of aggregate bank lending.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3 we analyze the capital decision of a representative bank. Section 4 defines the equilibrium and provides the comparative statics of equilibrium loan rates and banks' capital holdings.
In Section 5 we present the numerical results concerning the size and cyclical behavior of capital holdings, capital buffers, credit rationing, and probabilities of bank failure in a number of parameterizations of the model. In Section 6 we examine adjustments of the Basel II framework that reduce its procyclical effects. Section 7 discusses the robustness of our results to changes in some of the key assumptions of the model. Section 8 concludes.
Appendix A contains the proofs of the analytical results, and Appendix B discusses the choice of parameter values for the numerical analysis.
The Model
Consider a discrete time economy in which time is indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, ... The economy is populated by three classes of risk-neutral agents: entrepreneurs, banks, and investors.
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs belong to overlapping generations formed by a continuum of measure one of exante identical and penniless individuals who remain active for up to two periods (three dates).
Entrepreneurs have the opportunity to undertake investment projects with the following characteristics. The first period project of an entrepreneur born at date t requires a unit investment at that date. At date t + 1 the project yields 1 + a if it is successful, and 1 − λ if it fails, with a > 0 and 0 < λ < 1. The second period project of an entrepreneur born at date t requires μ units of investment at date t + 1. The return at date t + 2 of this project is independent of the return of the initial project, and equals (1 + a)μ if it is successful, and
(1 − λ)μ if it fails, so parameter μ measures the scale of the second period project.
All projects operating from date t to date t + 1 have an identical probability of failure p t . The outcomes of contemporaneous projects exhibit positive but imperfect correlation, so their aggregate failure rate x t is a continuous random variable with support [0, 1] and cumulative distribution function (cdf) F t (x t ) such that
For simplicity, we consider the case in which the history of the economy up to date t only affects F t (x t ) (and, thus, p t ) through an observable state variable s t that can take two values, h and l, and follows a Markov chain with q h = Pr (s t = h | s t−1 = h) and q l = Pr (s t = h | s t−1 = l) .
Moreover, we assume that the cdfs corresponding to the two states, F h (·) and F l (·), are ranked in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, so that the probabilities of business failure in each state satisfy
Thus states h and l may be interpreted as recession (high business failure) and expansion (low business failure) states, respectively.
Banks
Banks are competitive intermediaries specialized in channeling funds from investors to entrepreneurs. Following the literature on relationship banking, we assume that the financing of an entrepreneur in this economy relies on a sequence of one-period loans granted by the single bank from which the entrepreneur obtains his first loan. We also assume that setting up the relationship with the entrepreneur makes the bank incur some cost c, to be subtracted from first period revenue. 8 Finally, for simplicity, we abstract from the possibility that part of the required second period investment μ is internally financed by the entrepreneur.
9
Banks are funded with deposits and equity capital, both of which are raised from investors. To simplify the analysis we assume that deposits are fully insured (at a zero premium), and their supply is perfectly elastic at a risk-free rate that we normalize to zero.
10
We also assume that investors require an excess return δ ≥ 0 on each unit of equity capital.
The cost of capital δ is intended to capture in a reduced-form manner distortions (such as agency costs of equity or debt tax shields) that introduce a comparative disadvantage of equity financing relative to deposit financing-in addition to deposit insurance.
11
We introduce an important imperfection concerning banks' equity financing: While banks entering the market or renewing their portfolio of lending relationships can raise new equity in an unrestricted manner, recapitalization is impossible for banks with ongoing lending relationships. This assumption is intended to capture in a simple way the long delays or prohibitive dilution costs that a bank with opaque assets in place might face when organizing an urgent equity injection.
12
Banks are managed in the interest of their shareholders, who are protected by limited liability. Entry to the banking sector is free at all dates, but banks are subject to a capital requirement that obliges them to hold a capital-to-loans ratio of at least γ s on the loans made when the state of the economy is s. This formulation encompasses both the risk-insentitive (Basel I) and risk-sensitive (Basel II) type of regulation, as well as a laissez-faire environment with zero capital requirements. In Basel I the capital requirement is (for corporate loans) a constant ratio γ l = γ h = 8%. Basel II aims at a better alignment of capital requirements with the underlying banking risks, and consequently requires higher capital for riskier loans.
In our setup there is no cross-sectional heterogeneity among borrowers but the state of the economy affects the risk of the representative loan, so Basel II amounts to a capital requirement in the high default state, γ h , higher than the capital requirement in the low default state, γ l .
13
11 Further to the reasons for the extra cost of equity financing offered by the corporate finance literature, Holmström and Tirole (1997) and Diamond and Rajan (2000) provide agency-based explanations specifically related to banks' monitoring role. 12 These costs are most likely related to asymmetric information. Specifically, in a world in which banks learned about their borrowers after starting a lending relationship (like in Sharpe, 1990 ) and borrower quality were asymmetrically distributed across banks, the market for seasoned equity offerings might be affected by a lemons problem (like in Myers and Majluf, 1984) . Thus, after a negative shock, banks with lending relationships of poorer quality would be more interested in issuing equity at any given price, which explains why the prices at which new equity could be raised may be unattractive to banks with higher-quality relationships and why, in sufficiently adverse circumstances, the market for those SEOs may collapse. 13 The precise Basel II formula that relates the capital requirement γ s to the loans' probability of default p s will be described in Section 5.1. Although Basel II stipulates that estimates of the probability of default "must be a long-run average of one-year default rates" (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004, paragraph 447), industry practices based on point-in-time rating systems, the dynamics of rating migrations, and composition effects make the effective capital charges on a representative loan portfolio very likely to To guarantee that the funding of investment projects is attractive to banks at all dates, we assume that
for s = h, l. Thus, in all states of the economy, the expected return per unit of investment, net of the setup cost c, is greater than the cost of funding it with 1 − γ s deposits and γ s capital.
3 Banks' Capital Decision 14 In this economy, the supply of loans to the entrepreneurs who start up at date t might be affected by the recapitalization constraint faced by their banks at date t + 1. In fact, banks will be aware of this and, in order to better accommodate the effect of negative shocks to their first period income or possibly higher capital requirements in the case of risk-sensitive capital regulation, they may hold a buffer of equity capital on top of the first period regulatory minimum.
To understand the financing problem faced by each generation of entrepreneurs in this economy, consider a representative bank that lends to the measure one continuum of entrepreneurs starting up at date t, possibly refinances them at date t + 1, and gets liquidated at date t + 2. 15 Let s and s 0 denote the states of the economy at dates t and t + 1, respectively. be higher in recessions than in expansions. See, for example, Stein (2004), Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson, and Tsomocos (2005) , Gordy and Howells (2006) , and Saurina and Trucharte (2007) . 14 Notice that a bank that can raise capital at date t is essentially identical to a new bank established at that date. 15 It will become obvious that banks that can issue equity face constant returns relative to the size of their loan portfolio.
At date t the representative bank raises 1 − k s deposits and k s ≥ γ s capital, and invests these funds in a unit portfolio of first period loans. The equilibrium interest rate on these initial loans, denoted r s , will be determined endogenously, as explained below, but under our perfect competition assumption the bank takes it as given. Since the supply of deposits is perfectly elastic at a zero interest rate, r s should be interpreted as the spread between initial loan rates and deposit rates.
At date t + 1 the bank gets 1 + r s from the fraction 1 − x t of performing loans (that is, those extended to entrepreneurs whose projects are successful) and 1 − λ from the fraction x t of defaulted loans, and incurs the setup cost c, so its assets are 1 + r s − x t (λ + r s ) − c, while its deposit liabilities are 1 − k s . Thus its capital at date t + 1 is
where x t is a random variable whose cdf conditional on the state of the economy at date t
, it is immediate to show that bank failure occurs when the default rate x t exceeds the critical value
The entrepreneurs that start up at date t demand an amount μ of second period loans at date t + 1. 16 At this stage entrepreneurs are dependent on the bank, so their demand is inelastic as long as the loan interest rate does not exceed the success return of the projects in the second investment period. Thus the second period loan rate will be a.
Since the bank cannot issue new equity at date t + 1, its maximum lending capacity is given by the ratio between its available capital k 0 s (x t ) and the capital requirement γ s 0 , which depends on the state of the economy s 0 at date t + 1. Thus, whenever k 0 s (x t ) ≥ 0 there are two cases to consider: the case with excess lending capacity, k 0 s (x t ) ≥ γ s 0 μ, and the case with insufficient lending capacity, k
Note that this includes entrepreneurs that defaulted on their initial loans. This is because under our assumptions such default does not reveal any information about the entrepreneurs' second period projects.
immediate to show that the latter case arises when the default rate x t exceeds the critical value e
which is obviously smaller than b x s , defined in (3). Thus, whenever 0 < e x ss 0 < b x s < 1, one can find three different situations at date t + 1, depending on the realization of the default rate: for x t ∈ [0, e x ss 0 ], the representative bank has excess lending capacity; for x t ∈ (e x ss 0 , b
the bank has insufficient lending capacity; and for x t ∈ (b x s , 1] the bank fails. We next derive the expected continuation payoffs of the bank's shareholders in each of the two cases where the bank does not fail.
When there is excess lending capacity at date t + 1 the bank finances μ loans using
17 At date t + 2 the bank gets 1 + a from the fraction 1−x t+1 of performing loans and 1−λ from the fraction x t+1 of defaulted loans, so its
expected payoff, conditional on the state of the economy at date t + 1, can be expressed as μπ s 0 , where
is the expected gross equity return on a per-unit-of-loans basis. The value of shareholders' stake in the bank at date t + 1, inclusive of the dividend k 0 s (x t ) − γ s 0 μ, can be written as
where β = 1/(1 + δ) is the shareholders' discount factor implied by the cost of capital δ.
The first term in (6) measures the net present value contribution of the capital that remains invested in the bank up to date t + 2. Assumption (1) guarantees that βπ s 0 > γ s 0 , so that such contribution is positive.
18 17 Since entrepreneurs born at date t + 1 borrow from banks that can raise equity at that date, the bank may use the excess capital to either pay a dividend to its shareholders or to reduce the deposits to be raised at this date. However, under deposit insurance and δ ≥ 0, the second alternative is strictly suboptimal.
18 To see this, notice that
When there is insufficient lending capacity at date t+1 the bank finances k
capital. At date t + 2 shareholders' expected payoff, conditional on the state of the economy at date t+1, can be expressed as π s 0 k 0 s (x t )/γ s 0 , where π s 0 is the expected gross equity return on a per-unit-of-loans basis given by (5). When there is insufficient lending capacity at date t + 1 the bank pays no dividends at that date and, hence, the value of shareholders' stake in the bank is just
As before, assumption (1) implies that βπ s 0 > γ s 0 , and hence shareholders strictly benefit from keeping k 0 s (x t ) invested in the bank. Putting together the two cases, as well as the case in which the bank fails, we can express the market value of the bank at date t + 1, inclusive of dividends, as
which is a continuous and piecewise linear function of x t . 19 Going backward one period, the net present value of the representative bank that in state s holds capital k s and charges an interest rate r s on its unit of initial loans is
where the operator E t (·) takes care of the fact that, at date t, v s is subject to the uncertainty about both the state of the economy at date t + 1 (which affects the second period capital requirement γ s 0 and gross equity return π s 0 ) and the default rate x t of initial loans (which determines the capital k 0 s (x t ) available at that date). Taking as given the initial loan rate r s , the representative bank that first lends to a generation of entrepreneurs in state s will choose its capital k s so as to maximize v s (k s , r s )
19 Note that βπ s 0 > γ s 0 implies that if the bank does not fail at date t + 1 the market value of its equity v ss 0 (x t ) is strictly greater than the accounting value k
is continuous in k s , for any given interest rate r s , the bank's capital decision always has a solution. In Appendix A we show that the function v s (k s , r s ) is neither concave nor convex in k s , and that we may have interior solutions or corner solutions with k s = γ s . When the solution is interior, there is a positive probability that the bank has insufficient lending capacity in the high default state s 0 = h (and possibly also in the low default state s 0 = l), and there is a positive probability that the bank has excess lending capacity in the low default state s 0 = l (and possibly also in the high default state s 0 = h). The intuition for this result is as follows. If in the two possible states at date t + 1 the bank had a zero probability of finding itself with insufficient lending capacity, then it would have an incentive to reduce its capital at date t in order to reduce its funding costs at that date. On the other hand, if in the two possible states at date t + 1 the bank had a zero probability of finding itself with excess lending capacity, then it would have an incentive either to increase its capital at date t and thereby relax the capital constraint at date t + 1, or to go to the corner k s = γ s .
20

Equilibrium
In the previous section we have characterized banks' capital and lending decisions at the dates in which they can raise capital, as well as at the dates in which they cannot. This analysis has taken as given the interest rate r s at the beginning of a lending relationship in state s, with the continuation loan rate being the success return a of the second period investment projects. In order to define an equilibrium, it only remains to describe how the initial loan rate is determined.
Given our free entry assumption, in equilibrium the pricing of these loans must be such that the net present value of the bank is zero under the bank's optimal capital decision.
Were it negative, no bank would extend loans. Were it positive, incumbent banks would have an incentive to expand, and new banks would profit from entering the market. Hence 20 The possible preference for the corner k s = γ s is due to the fact that, in this case, the function v s (k s , r s ) is (locally) either decreasing or convex in k s ; see Appendix A for the details.
in each state of the economy s = h, l we must have
Therefore we may define an equilibrium as a sequence of pairs {(k t , r t )} describing the capital-to-loan ratio k t of the banks that can issue equity at date t and the interest rate r t charged on their initial loans, such that each pair (k t , r t ) satisfies (10) and (11) 
where s t is the state of the economy at date t.
The existence of an equilibrium is easy to establish. Differentiating (10) 
Comparative statics
The structural parameters that describe the economy are the following: The success return a (which determines the interest rate of continuation loans), the loss given default λ, the scale of the second period projects μ, the cost of setting up a lending relationship c, the cost of bank equity capital δ, the probabilities of transition from each state to the high default state q h and q l , and the capital requirements γ h and γ l . To complete the description of the economy, one must also specify the state-contingent cdfs of the default rate, F h (x t ) and
21 However, since the function v s (k s , r s ) is neither concave nor convex in k s , there may be multiple optimal values of k s corresponding to r * s . (10) with respect to each exogenous parameter z. The effects of the various parameters on r * s are inversely related to their impact on the profitability of banks' lending activity. Other things equal, a and μ impact positively on the profitability of continuation lending; λ affects negatively the profitability of both initial lending (directly) and continuation lending (directly and by reducing the availability of capital in the second period); c has a similar negative effect (with no direct effect on the profitability of continuation loans); δ increases the cost of equity funding in both periods; γ h and γ l increase the burden of capital regulation in the corresponding initial state, as well as in the corresponding continuation state (which will be h or l with probabilities q s and 1 − q s , respectively); finally, q s decreases the profitability of continuation lending because, in the high default state h, loan losses are higher and the corresponding capital requirement γ h may also be higher. Table 2 summarizes the comparative statics of the equilibrium initial capital k * s chosen by the representative bank in an interior solution-obviously, when the solution is at the corner k * s = γ s , marginal changes in parameters other than the capital requirement γ s do not change k * s . As further explained in Appendix A, the recursive nature of the comparative statics of the system given by (10) and (11) makes it convenient to decompose the effects of the change in any parameter z into a direct effect (for constant r * s ) and a loan rate effect (due to the change in r * s ):
Loan rate effects can be easily determined. Differentiating the first-order condition that
The coefficient of ∂k * s /∂r s is negative, by the second-order condition that characterizes k * s in an interior solution, and the second term is negative (see Appendix A). Hence ∂k * s /∂r s is negative, which implies that the signs of loan rate effects are the opposite to those in Table   1 . Intuitively, the initial capital k s and the initial loan rate r s are substitutes in the role of providing the bank with sufficient capital for its continuation lending (see the definition of (2)). In an interior solution, the marginal value of k s is decreasing in k s , and thus also in r s , so a larger r s reduces the bank's incentive to hold excess capital. 
For the parameters a, μ, and δ, the direct and the loan rate effects point in the same direction, so the total effect can be analytically signed. In essence, higher profitability of continuation lending (captured by a and μ) and lower costs of capital (captured by δ) encourage banks to hold larger capital buffers in order to better self-insure against the default shocks that threaten its continuation lending. For the setup cost c, the direct and the loan rate effects have unambiguous but opposite signs, so the total effect is ambiguous. The positive direct effect comes from the fact that, by the definition of k 0 s (x) in (2), c subtracts to the bank's continuation lending capacity exactly like k s adds to it, without affecting the profitability of such lending and hence the marginal gains from self-insuring against default shocks. The direct effects on k s of the parameters λ, q s , γ h , and γ l have ambiguous signs.
Increasing any of these parameters simultaneously reduces the profitability of continuation lending and impairs the expected capital position of the bank when such lending has to be made. The value of holding excess capital in the initial lending period falls, but the prospects of ending up with insufficient capital increase. So the profitability of continuation lending and the need for self-insurance against default shocks move in opposite directions.
The resulting ambiguity of the direct effects extends to the total effects.
The details of the analytical expressions suggest that the shape of the distributions of default rates matter for the determination of these effects, which eventually becomes a question to be elucidated either empirically or by numerically solving the model under realistic parameterizations. In the rest of the paper, we resort to the second alternative, if only because the experience accumulated with Basel II capital requirements is still very short and the corresponding data is heavily affected by the unprecedented severity of the current crisis.
Numerical Results
To further explore the forces that affect banks' initial capital buffers as well as to assess the implications for the dynamics of lending under different regulations, we numerically solve the model in a number of plausible scenarios. Importantly, in all scenarios we assume that the state-contingent probability distributions of the default rate, described by the cdfs F h (x t ) and F l (x t ), conform to the single risk factor model that underlies the capital requirements associated with the IRB approach of Basel II. 22 This means that we assess the implications of the new capital requirements under the assumption that the supervisor's model of refer- 22 The single factor model is due to Vasicek (2002) and its use as a foundation for the capital requirements of Basel II is due to Gordy (2003) .
ence is correct. 23 In line with the one-year ahead value-at-risk perspective of Basel II, the parameterization assumes that each model period corresponds to one calendar year.
The single risk factor model
Suppose that the project undertaken by entrepreneur i at date t fails if y it < 0, where y it is a latent random variable defined by
where α t is a parameter determined by the state of the economy at date t, u t is a single factor of systematic risk, ε it is an idiosyncratic risk factor, and ρ t ∈ (0, 1) is a state-contingent parameter that determines the correlation among project failures. It is assumed that u t and ε it are N(0, 1) random variables, independently distributed from each other and over time, as well as, in the case of ε it , across projects. Let Φ(·) denote the cdf of a standard normal random variable. Conditional on the information available at date t, the probability of failure
With a continuum of projects, the aggregate failure rate x t is only a function of the realization of the single risk factor u t . Specifically, by the law of large numbers, x t coincides with the probability of failure of a (representative) project i conditional on the information available at t and the realization of u t :
Using the fact that u t ∼ N(0, 1), the cumulative distribution function of the aggregate failure rate can be expressed as
In Basel II the correlation parameter ρ t is assumed to be a decreasing function of the state-contingent probability of default p t . Hence we postulate the following state-contingent 23 Of course, the model could be similarly solved under alternative specifications of the relevant cdfs, but in that case the requirements set under the regulatory formula described below would not have the direct value-at-risk interpretation implied by our parameterization. probability distributions of the default rate
where, as stipulated by Basel II for corporate loans, the correlation parameter ρ s is decreasing in the probability of default p s according to the formula ρ s = 0.12
In the IRB approach of Basel II, capital must cover the one-year ahead losses due to loan defaults with a probability of 99.9%. Hence the capital requirement in state s is given by
s (0.999) is the 99.9% quantile of the distribution of the default rate. Using (12), the Basel II capital requirement becomes
where ρ s is given by (13). This is the formula for corporate exposures of a one-year maturity that appears in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004, paragraph 272) . 24 It should be noted that Basel II establishes that the expected losses, λp s , should be covered with general loan-loss provisions, while the remaining charge, λ(γ s − p s ), should be covered with capital. However, from the perspective of our analysis, provisions are just another form of equity capital, so the distinction between the expected and unexpected components of loan losses is immaterial. Table 3 shows the set of parameter values that define the three benchmark scenarios considered in our numerical analysis. The scenarios differ in the volatility of the state-contingent probabilities of default p l and p h . We briefly comment on them here, relegating further discussion in the light of available data on the US banking sector to Appendix B. Note that because of our normalization of the risk-free rate to zero, all interest rates and rates of return in the parameterization should be interpreted as spreads over the risk-free rate. The three PD scenarios are defined so as to keep the expected capital charge under Basel II equal to 8%, which is the capital requirement under Basel I. Appendix B discusses the choice of parameter values in the light of available data on US banks.
Benchmark scenarios
Panel A of Table 3 contains the parameters that are common to the three scenarios. The value of the success return a = 0.04 implies that the interest rate of continuation loans is 4%. 25 The loss given default (LGD) parameter λ = 0.45 is taken from the Basel II "foundation IRB" formula for unsecured corporate exposures. 26 The scale of the second period projects μ = 1 provides a neutral starting point-fine-tuning this parameter would require some empirical estimation of the growth rate of loan exposures along a typical corporate lending relationship or, alternatively, of the asset growth rate in a representative business 25 The success return could be higher, as long as the part that can be pledged to the bank without destroying the entrepreneur's incentives is set at 4%. See Holmström and Tirole (1997) for a discussion of the concept of pledgeable return. 26 In the "advanced IRB" approach banks are allowed to use their own internal models to estimate λ. Panel B of It is important to note that we are assuming that the LGD parameter λ does no depend on the state s. Altman et al. (2005) , using data on bond defaults, find that LGDs are positively correlated with default rates. In the context of our model, however, cyclical variation in
LGDs has a similar effect on banks' profits and Basel II capital requirements as an increase in the cyclical variation in PDs. Hence, the effects of our conservative assumption could be offset by placing more weight on the results corresponding to the scenarios with more volatile PDs.
27 Expected durations are computed as q l + 2(1 − q l )q l + 3(1 − q l ) 2 q l + ... = 1/q l = 5 for state l, and
for state h. It should be noted that, in line with the empirical findings of Bruche and González-Aguado (2006), in our parameterization credit cycle downturns last longer than typical business cycle downturns. 28 The unconditional probabilities of the low and the high default state, denoted φ l and φ h , can be obtained by solving the system of equations q l φ l +q h φ h = φ h and φ l + φ h = 1, which gives φ l = (1−q h )/(1−q h +q l ) ' 0.64 and φ h = q l /(1 − q h + q l ) ' 0.36. Table 4 shows initial loan rates r * s , initial capital k * s , and the implied capital buffers ∆ * s = k * s −γ s , for s = h, l, in each of the scenarios described in Table 3 and under the two regulatory frameworks that we want to compare: Basel I, with a flat capital requirements of 8%, and Basel II, with the requirements given by (14) . As a reference, we also include the results in a laissez-faire environment without capital requirements (γ h = γ l = 0). The parameters that define each of the three scenarios and the associated Basel II capital requirements are described in Table 3 . The Basel I capital requirement is always 8%.
Capital buffers and procyclicality
The results show that initial loan rates are always higher in the high default state, reflecting the need to compensate banks for both a higher PD and a lower prospective profitability of continuation lending (since the high default state h is more likely to occur after state h than after state l). These rates are very similar in the two Basel frameworks, confirming previous results from static models predicting that the loan pricing implications of Basel II will be small. 29 Basel II slightly increases loan rates in the high default state, and induces no significant change in loan rates in the low default state. These effects may be explained by the fact that Basel II significantly increases banks' capital in the high default state, but has a smaller impact on capital in the low default state.
29 See Repullo and Suarez (2004 anticipate that if the economy switches to the low default state l the capital requirement will decrease from γ h to γ l , so they have an incentive to hold smaller capital buffers than under Basel I. The numerical results for the three scenarios show that the first effect (higher buffers in state l) turns out to be more important than the second effect (lower buffers in state h), which implies that the move from Basel I to Basel II will increase the long-run average level of the capital buffers (computed with the unconditional probabilities of visiting each state).
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As for the laissez-faire environment, the results in Table 4 confirm that, under our parameterization, the "economic capital" chosen by banks starting lending relationships is well-below the regulatory capital of any of the two Basel frameworks, but significantly different from zero (and very similar across states), which reflects banks' interest in preserving their valuable lending during the second period. 32 The lower initial interest rates in both 30 This is consistent with the existing evidence about the behavior of capital buffers under Basel Iincluding Ayuso et al. (2004) with Spanish data, Lindquist (2004) with Norwegian data, and Bikker and Metzemakers (2004) with data from 29 OECD countries-and raises doubts about the interpretation that such evidence reflects banks' myopia. 31 The increase in the medium volatility scenario is of 0.88 percentage points. 32 Elizalde and Repullo (2007) discuss the concept of economic capital (and its relationship with the states (relative to the Basel frameworks) reflect the savings on the costs of equity financing due to the use of less capital in the two lending periods. Table 5 compares the cyclical behavior of credit rationing under Basel I and Basel II, as well as in the laissez-faire environment. Lending in any given period is made up of initial loans, whose quantity is always one, and continuation loans, whose quantity varies with the lending capacity of the banks that are unable to issue equity in that period. We denote by credit rationing the expected percentage of continuation projects that cannot be undertaken because of banks' insufficient lending capacity. Table 5 shows credit rationing in state s 0 = l, h when it is reached from state s = l, h according to any of the four possible sequences (s, s 0 ). In our simple model, investment and hence expected gross output (the returns from the funded investment projects) are linearly related to total credit, given the state of the economy, so we can use credit rationing as a summary statistic of aggregate economic activity.
In Basel I (as well as in the laissez-faire environment) credit rationing does not depend on whether the arrival state s 0 is a high or a low default state, since the capital requirement is constant (at 8% or 0%, respectively). Rationing only depends on the profits realized during the previous period, which determine the capital available for continuation lending. The distribution of this random variable depends on the state s of the economy in the previous period. This explains why the figures for Basel I (and the laissez-faire environment) in Table   5 only vary with s in each scenario, and are smaller for s = l than for s = h.
regulatory capital of Basel II) in a model where banks are concerned about the loss of charter values when they become insolvent. 
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The parameters that define each of the scenarios and the associated Basel II capital requirements are described in Table 3 . The Basel I capital requirement is 8%. Credit rationing is the expected percentage of continuation projects that cannot be undertaken because of banks' insufficient lending capacity. The rows show credit rationing in state s' when it is reached from state s according to the sequence (s,s') in the first column. Rows labeled 'unconditional' show weighted averages based on the unconditional probabilities of each state.
Under Basel II, the impact of bank profits is also present, but the overall effects on credit rationing are dominated by the cross-state variation of the capital requirements, and its endogenous effects on capital buffers. Thus the sequences with (s, s 0 ) = (l, h), and then those with (s, s 0 ) = (h, h), systematically exhibit the largest credit rationing. Intuitively, in the low default state l the transition to the high default state h is less likely than continuing in h after being in h; additionally, in state l the required capital is lower than in state h. For both reasons, banks hold less capital in s = l than in s = h (see Table 4 ). But then if the economy ends up in s 0 = h, the combination of a lower capitalization in the previous period and a higher current requirement explains the very sizable contractions in lending capacity shown in Table 5 . 33 In particular, for the medium volatility scenario, when the economy goes from the low to the high default state (and despite of the fact that banks hold a capital buffer of 5.1% in the low default state) an average of 10.7% of the continuation projects are rationed, a figure that goes up to 24.4% in the high volatility scenario.
Thus Basel II implies significantly larger cyclical variation in credit rationing (and consequently in investment and output) than Basel I. Its incidence on the average level of credit rationing, shown in the rows labeled 'unconditional' in Table 5 , depends on the volatility of PDs along the cycle. For the medium volatility scenario, the extra cost of Basel II in terms of long-run average credit rationing amounts to about 0.7% of the potential continuation investment.
The behavior of credit rationing in the laissez-faire environment is very much an amplified version of what is observed under Basel I, with levels of rationing that are between 50% and 100% larger. In relation with Basel II, however, the comparison depends on the volatility of PDs along the cycle: except in the low volatility scenario, the laissez-faire exhibits lower cyclicality and, in the high volatility scenario, it even exhibits lower unconditional expected credit rationing.
Banks' solvency
We next compare the various regulatory regimes in terms of banks' solvency. Table 6 reports the probability of failure of the representative bank for each of the scenarios described in Table 3 and each of the possible states of the economy. These probabilities are different for banks making initial loans (that in state s start with capital k s , earn interest r s on performing loans, and pay the cost c of starting up their lending relationships) and banks 33 Interestingly, for the sequences with s 0 = l (which entail the lowest credit rationing under Basel II), the effect of bank profits becomes visible again, producing lower rationing in the (l, l) sequence than in the (h, l) sequence.
making continuation loans (that in state s start with capital γ s , earn interest a on performing loans, and do not pay c). Unlike in the results on credit rationing, these probabilities are purely forward-looking (i.e., they do not depend on the state of the economy in the previous period) and hence we only report their conditional-on-s and unconditional values. Table 6 shows that the probabilities of bank failure are much more uniform across states under the risk-sensitive capital requirements of Basel II than under the constant 8% capital requirement of Basel I. Conditional on the state of the economy, the link between the level of the requirements and the level of solvency of second period banks is direct (since these banks hold no capital buffers and the net interest income earned on performing loans is the same in both states), so not surprisingly Basel II implies a significant improvement in solvency in the high default state h and a reduction in solvency in the low default state l, with the unconditional effect being clearly positive. For first period banks there are additional effects coming from the endogenous capital buffers and loan interest rates. Our results in Table   4 show that the latter effects are very small, so solvency is inversely related to the total holdings of capital. Hence Basel II increases the solvency of first period banks in state h, and (in the low and medium volatility scenario) it also increases their solvency in state l, despite imposing lower requirements than the 8% of Basel I. The unconditional effect of Basel II on the solvency of first period banks is positive in the three scenarios. All in all, Basel II roughly halves the probabilities of bank failure associated with Basel I, and makes the risk of failure more evenly distributed over time. This suggests that the risk-sensitive capital requirements of Basel II have a payoff in terms of the long-term solvency of the banking system. The parameters that define each of the scenarios and the associated Basel II capital requirements are described in Table 3 . The Basel I capital requirement is 8%. Rows labeled 'unconditional' show weighted averages based on the unconditional probabilities of each state.
It is worth noting that the probabilities of bank failure are very small under both regulations-unconditionally, they range between 0.024% and 0.063% under Basel I, and between 0.015% and 0.036% under Basel II. Interestingly, the combination of capital buffers and net interest income earned on performing loans makes the latter much lower than the 0.1% implied by the 99.9% confidence level of Basel II. This combination also explains the fact that the probabilities of bank failure under the laissez-faire environment are not very high-unconditionally, they range between 2.710% and 3.657%.
Policy analysis
Our previous results show that the risk-sensitive Basel II regime induces much more cyclicality in the supply of bank credit than the risk-insensitive Basel I regime. Specifically, under its original formulation, the Basel II regime tends to produce a particularly strong reduction in banks' lending capacity (and a rise in credit rationing) when the economy goes into a recession. The results also indicate that bank solvency is higher under Basel II than under Basel I.
These results suggest that the comparison of Basel I and Basel II in welfare terms is not trivial and will crucially depend on the (structural or reduced-form) imputation of a social cost to bank failures. 34 Although the model could be extended to perform such a welfare analysis, the discussion in this section will focus on less normative point: we will show that it is possible to reduce the procyclical effects of Basel II without fully renouncing to risksensitiveness or to the targeted long-term confidence. The adjustments that we consider consist of modifying the cyclical profile of the confidence levels set by the regulator in such a way that keeps their long-term average at 99.9%-the current level in the IRB approach of Basel II-but lessens the target in those states (or sequences of states) where credit rationing turned out to be the highest under the Basel II regime. Table 7 shows the results of two specific policy experiments of this kind. Both are performed under the parameterization of the medium volatility scenario described in Table   3 . Policy 1 reduces the confidence level in the high default state h to 99.8% and increases the confidence level in the low default state l to η > 99.9% so as to maintain the long-run average at 99.9%. Thus η solves: Repullo and Suarez (2004) perform this type of welfare analysis in a static setup where procyclicality is not a concern, but capital requirements imply a deadweigh loss due to the extra cost of equity financing.
where φ l and φ h are, respectively, the unconditional probabilities of the low and the high default state.
35 Such a small adjustment causes a relevant change in capital requirements (from 6.6% to 7.9% for γ l and from 10.5% to 9.3% for γ h ), modifying banks' optimal buffers (which become less procyclical), and smoothing the cyclicality of credit rationing. As shown in Panel A of Table 7 , credit rationing in the sequences (l, h) and (h, h) falls from 10.7% and 4.5%, respectively, to less than 4% in both sequences. Unconditionally, it falls from 2.6% to 1.9%, which is its unconditional value under Basel I. Interestingly, although the probabilities of bank failure in the high default state h obviously increase, they remain lower than 0.08% in all cells, and their unconditional average only increases from 0.029% to 0.040% for first period banks, and from 0.015% to 0.017% for second period banks.
In Policy 2 we confine the reduced 99.8% confidence level to periods where state h occurs after state l. The objective is to reduce the credit rationing detected in the second period of sequences with (s, s 0 ) = (l, h). The capital requirement when h occurs after h is left unchanged, while the confidence level applied to the second period of the sequences (l, l)
and (h, l) is increased so as to to keep the long-run average confidence level at 99.9%. By construction, Policy 2 makes smaller adjustments in the Basel II capital requirements, so it will be less effective than Policy 1 in terms of smoothing credit rationing, but it will also be less significant in terms of its implications for banks' solvency. The results in Table 7 show that credit rationing in the second period of the (l, h) sequence gets substantially reduced, but not as much as with Policy 1, while the unconditional probabilities of bank failure are almost unchanged relative to those of Basel II.
All in all, our policy experiments show the feasibility of achieving significant gains in terms of credit rationing without major costs in terms of banks' long-term solvency. This can be achieved with cyclical adjustments that preserve the value-at-risk foundation of the Basel II requirements. The choice between Policy 1 and Policy 2 (or the fine tuning of their details) should eventually depend on the trade-off between the gains in terms of a smoother and lower credit rationing, and the losses in terms of less smooth and slightly higher probabilities of bank failure.
35 See Footnote 28 for the expressions of φ l and φ h in terms of the transition probabilities q l and q h . The parameters and associated Basel II capital requirements are those of the medium volatility scenario described in Table 3 . The Basel I capital requirement is 8%. Policy 1 reduces the confidence level of the Basel II formula to 99.8% in state h and increases it in state l so as to keep the unconditional average at 99.9%. Policy 2 sets the confidence level at 99.8% only when state h occurs after state l, compensating it when state l occurs so as to keep the unconditional average at 99.9%. Columns labeled 'unconditional' show weighted averages based on the unconditional probabilities of each state.
Discussion
In this section we discuss some simplifying features of our model, including the distribution of banks' market power in the first and second period of the lending relationships, the use of short-term loan contracts, and the assumption that banks with ongoing relationships have no access to the equity market. We consider the possible effects of relaxing these assumptions, noting that in some cases our conclusions about the procyclicality of Basel II would be strengthened.
Competition and market power
In our model banks are perfectly competitive in the market for first period loans and act as monopolists in the market for second period loans. This is justified by the fact that borrowers get locked-in after one period due to some (unmodeled) asymmetric information problem (e.g., one that makes borrowers searching for a new bank after one period look like "rejected" by the initial bank, which leads to a standard lemons problem in the refinancing market). We have opted for an all-or-nothing modeling of the lock-in effect for several reasons. The most obvious one is tractability: if the market for continuation loans were more competitive, the degree of effective competition and the resulting loan rates would vary with the degree of credit rationing. Even in the polar case of perfect competition in the market for second period loans, over the range of poor realizations of the risk factor that lead to rationing, banks would be able to appropriate scarcity rents from their (non-rationed)
borrowers. 36 Relative to the current modeling, the more competitive market for second period loans would entail lower continuation rents for banks, and hence lower incentives for them to keep capital buffers. This uncovers a second justification for our assumption: it yields a conservative estimate of the procyclicality induced by capital regulation.
Short-term loan contracts
We have described the relationship between entrepreneurs and banks as instrumented by a sequence of one-period loans. One might wonder whether focusing on short-term contracts builds in the "imperfection" that drives our main results. The answer is yes and no. With long-term contracts, or more generally contracts that differ from the sequence of one-period loans on which we focus, there might be room for improving over the credit allocation outcomes obtained in our analysis. For example, for given capital buffers, setting higher loan rates in the first period and lower loan rates in the second would reduce the incidence of credit rationing, since banks would have more capital to support their second period lending. But in the context of our model, long-term contracts pose important commitment and enforcement problems. In particular, they would have to specify the loan rates in the first and the second period, as well as the rationing scheme to be used in those cases where the bank ends up with insufficient lending capacity (since otherwise the bank might try to renegotiate the terms of the second period loans by threatening entrepreneurs to put them in the pool of rationed borrowers). This means that default rates in the first period would have to be verifiable, and banks would have to be restricted in their ability to pay dividends.
They might also have to commit to maintain a capital buffer in the first period. The reason for this is that when competing for borrowers in the first period, banks internalize the whole surplus that the underlying investment projects generate over the two periods, but once the relationship starts, banks only internalize the return of their current and future lending. If the second period loan rate is lower than a, then banks do not take into account part of the continuation surplus when deciding how much capital to hold-recall that first period capital buffers are held for the purpose of reducing the expected credit rationing in the second period. All in all, the previous considerations suggest that there are serious commitment and enforcement problems that limit the possible improvements in the allocation of credit that long-term contracts might bring about.
Imperfect access to the equity market
The assumption that banks with ongoing relationships have no access to the equity market is obviously crucial for our results. With perfect, frictionless access to the equity market in the interim period, there would be no credit rationing among second period borrowers, except in the rare event that their bank fails (and it is not recapitalized by its shareholders).
Banks in such a context would most likely hold no buffers, at least under the high capital requirements of Basel I or Basel II. Given the ample evidence of equity-issuance frictions, the key question is whether the specificities of our approach-that ties these frictions to the informational asymmetries associated with relationship lending-drive the results.
A more general way of capturing equity-issuance frictions would be to assume that access can occur with some (exogenous) probability υ < 1. Changes in parameter υ could then be used to evaluate the "marginal" effects of the friction on capital buffers and credit rationing.
One could also explore situations in which υ is contingent on the state s 0 of the economy at the interim date. This extension would probably confirm the results obtained in the current setup and might even reinforce our conclusions about the procyclicality of the risk-sensitive capital requirements of Basel II.
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It should also be noted that the really strong assumption that we are making is that banks can frictionless access the equity market when they renew their stock of lending relationships.
This assumption is instrumental to achieving a tractable OLG structure in the context of an infinite horizon problem that otherwise would be characterized by longer memory and more complex dynamics (namely, credit rationing might also affect first period loans and the pricing of these loans might depend on the full history of the economy). A modeling alternative would be to assume a structure similar to the one in the popular Calvo (1983) model of staggered price setting, i.e., that in each period a fraction of the banks can issue new equity. In this context one would have to discuss the allocation of the newly born entrepreneurs to the existing banks. Would they demand loans to the recapitalizing banks only? If not, how would the pricing of the new loans be determined?
Other extensions
The framework used in this paper could also be extended in a number of other directions.
First, we could consider lending relationships that extend over more than two periods. If relationships last for T periods and banks cannot raise equity for the whole length of the relationship, the qualitative results should be very similar to ours. Such a model would, of course, yield richer dynamics, as the effect of a shock would propagate over several periods.
Second, we could consider alternative distributions F s (x t ) of the default rate x t , keeping the specification of the Basel II capital requirements as in (14), but allowing for thicker tails in the loan loss distribution. Third, we could incorporate cyclically-varying demand.
One easy way of doing this would be to let the scale μ of second period projects vary with the state s of the economy. A bigger challenge would be to introduce some "downward sloping" aggregate demand for loans, which could be done by assuming that entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their opportunity cost of becoming active in the first period. The already existing variability in projects' success probabilities would tend to produce (procyclical) variability in the demand for loans. Further variability might be introduced by replacing the current success return a for some a s . Finally, one could allow for feedback effects from constrained to unconstrained entrepreneurs by letting a t = a(I t ) instead of a, where a(I t ) is an increasing (and possibly concave) function of I t , the aggregate investment at date t. This will capture demand externalities or technological complementarities similar to those studied in endogenous growth theory. Analyzing these alternative models is beyond the scope of this paper.
Concluding Remarks
In many early supervisory and industry reports on the implications of Basel II, it was standard to first recognize the potential cyclical effects of the risk-sensitive capital requirements and then qualify that, given than most banks held capital in excess of the regulatory minima, the practical incidence of the procyclicality problem was likely to be small if not negligible.
In light of the disastrous experience accumulated during the current crisis, the temptation now is to presume that the buffers voluntarily chosen by the banks will never be "sufficient"
to prevent the procyclicality of bank lending and a more radical regulatory reform is needed. Our model provides a tractable framework in which it is possible to evaluate the cyclical effects of bank capital regulation without incurring in these misconceptions. To keep the analysis as transparent as possible, we have simplified on a number of dimensions. For example, we abstract from demand side fluctuations and aggregate feedback effects that might mitigate and exacerbate, respectively, the supply-side effects that we identify. As we have discussed above, one could take our model as a building block for a fuller dynamic general equilibrium model with a production sector partly composed of entrepreneurial firms that rely on relationship bank lending. One could also think about extensions that generalize our modeling of the frictions related to banks' access to equity financing. Our contribution, from this perspective, is to show that the interaction of relationship lending (which makes some borrowers dependent on the lending capacity of the specific bank with which they establish a relationship) with frictions in banks' access to equity markets (which makes some banks' lending capacity a function of their historically determined capital positions and the capital requirements imposed by regulation) has the potential to cause significant cyclical swings in the supply of credit.
Under realistic parameterizations, the model produces capital buffers and equilibrium loan rates whose levels and cyclicality in the Basel I regulatory environment are in line with those observed in the data. The same parameterizations when applied to the Basel II environment suggest that its risk-sensitive requirements imply a substantial increase in the procyclicality of bank lending. Specifically, despite banks taking precautions and holding larger buffers during expansions in order to have a reserve of capital for the next recession (when capital requirements rise), the arrival of recessions is normally associated with a sizeable credit crunch, as capital-constrained banks are induced to ration credit to some of their dependent borrowers.
Having a model that explicitly accounts for the endogenous determination of capital buffers and equilibrium loan rates is important for a rigorous analysis of the type of countercyclical adjustments that recent proposals on regulatory reform advocate. As an illustration, we have shown that small cyclical adjustments in the confidence level of Basel II would substantially reduce the incidence of credit rationing over the business cycle without compromising the long-run solvency targets implied in the original regulation.
Hence the function v ss 0 (k s , r s ) is linearly decreasing or strictly convex for k s ≤ c − r s + γ s 0 μ, linearly decreasing for k s ≥ c + λ + γ s 0 μ, and may be increasing or decreasing, and concave or convex for c − r s + γ s 0 μ < k s < c + λ + γ s 0 μ. Introducing the constraint k s ∈ [γ s , 1] (and assuming that parameter values are such that c + λ + γ s 0 μ < 1) it follows that the problem
has either a corner solution with k s = γ s , or an interior solution with
In the latter case we have 0 < e x ss 0 < 1, so there is a positive probability F s (e x ss 0 ) that the bank has excess lending capacity in state s 0 , and a positive probability 1 − F s (e x ss 0 ) that the bank has insufficient lending capacity in state s 0 .
Since
has either a corner solution with k s = γ s , or an interior solution with k s ∈ (c − r s + γ l μ, c + λ + γ h μ). In the latter case, there must be a positive probability that the bank has insufficient lending capacity in state s 0 = h (and possibly also in state s 0 = l), and a positive probability that the bank has excess lending capacity in state s 0 = l (and possibly also in state s 0 = h).
Comparative statics of the initial loan rate The sign of dr * s /dz for z = a, λ, μ, c, δ, q s , γ h , γ l can be obtained by total differentiation of (10):
When k * s is interior, the first-order condition for a maximum that follows from (11) gives ∂v s /∂k s | (k * s ,r * s ) = 0, so the first term in (17) vanishes. Moreover when k * s is interior it must be the case that 0 < e x ss 0 < 1 for at least one state s 0 , so differentiating (15) and (16) 
with strict inequality for at least one state s 0 . Hence we are left with:
Similarly, in a corner solution with k * s = γ s we have dk * s /dz = 0 for all z 6 = γ s , in which case the first term in (17) also vanishes and (18) Table A1 (and whose detailed expressions we omit, for brevity). The sign of dk * s /dz for z = a, λ, μ, c, δ, q s , γ h , γ l can be obtained by total differentiation of the first-order condition ∂v s /∂k s = 0 that characterizes an interior equilibrium: = 0 is a mixture of both cases since, depending on the sign of the effect of the marginal variation in a parameter, the optimal decision might shift from being at the corner to being interior. A similar complexity may occur if the change in a parameter breaks some underlying indifference between an interior and a corner solution (or between two interior solutions). We will omit the discussion of these cases, for simplicity.
Hence the sign of dk * s /dz coincides with the sign of the second term in brackets, which has two components: the direct effect of z on k * s (for constant r * s ) and the loan rate effect (due to the effect of z on r * s ). The signs of the direct effects shown in the first row of Table 2 coincide with the signs of the cross derivatives ∂ 2 v s /∂k s ∂z summarized in Table A2 (whose detailed expressions we omit, for brevity). The signs of the loan rate effects shown in the second row of Hence using the definitions (3) and (4) of b x s and e x ss 0 , together with the fact that γ l ≤ γ h , we have 1 − b x s < 1 − e x sl ≤ 1 − e x sh , so we conclude that where τ i , τ c , and τ e are the marginal tax rates on personal interest income, corporate income, and personal equity income, respectively. As in Hennessy and Whited (2007) , set τ i = 0.29
and consider τ c = 0.40 as an upper bound to τ c (based on the combination of the top statutory federal rate and the average state rate as reported by Graham, 2000) . Suppose, conservatively, that τ e = 0, so that the marginal investor manages to make its equity income fully exempt from personal taxation. Then we get MTS ' 0.04 for τ c = 0.32, where this last choice is consistent with US data. In particular, for US commercial banks over the period [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] , Applicable income taxes represented, on average, 31.7% of Pre-tax net operating income. As in Hennessy and Whited (2007) , this number can be seen as the expected tax rate in a situation in which the representative bank earns positive taxable income and hence faces an effective corporate tax rate of τ c with a probability of 80%, while it faces an effective zero tax rate with a probability of 20%.
Probabilities of transition to the high default state: q l = 0.20 and q h = 0.64. In our Markov switching setup, the expected durations of states l and h are 1/q l and 1/(1 − q h ), respectively. We calibrate these durations using data from the FDIC Historical Statistics on Banking (available at http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/index.asp). Specifically, we compute the annual ratio of Net loan and lease charge-offs to Gross loans and leases for FDIC-insured Non-performing loans to Total loans was slightly above 3% in years 1990-1993, declined to slightly above 2% in 1993, and remained below 1.5% (with a downward trend) for the rest of the decade. It is also possible to check the realism of our PD scenarios by looking at the ratio of Loan losses to Total loans, whose quarterly evolution over recent years appears in Figure 2 . Notice that under our assumption about the value of the LGD parameter, λ = 0.45
(which we take from the "foundation IRB" approach of Basel II), the average default rate behind the series in Figure 2 should be 1/0.45 ' 2.22 times the ratio depicted there, which again suggests the realism of our choice of PDs slightly above 1% in low default states and around 3% in high default states.
